Microsoft Patches 3 Zero-Days, But the Real Danger is Just Being Revealed
Windows • Microsoft 365 • Entra ID • Exploit Trends • US/EU/UK/AU/IN Cybersecurity
TL;DR
- Three Windows zero-days were patched today after evidence of active exploitation.
- The real risk persists: identity token theft, malicious OAuth apps, vulnerable drivers, and post-patch weaponization keep the door open if you only “click Update.”
- Action plan (24–72h): emergency patching, exploit guard hardening, token & consent hygiene, and driver & script control. Full checklist below.
Executive Brief for US/EU/UK/AU/IN Leadership
Yes, Microsoft patched three zero-days. No, that does not end the incident. Adversaries increasingly win after Patch Tuesday by abusing identity trust (stolen refresh tokens, persistent OAuth apps), signed-but-vulnerable drivers, and legacy protocols. The board-level risk is continuity: ransomware downtime, regulatory exposures (EU NIS2, UK NCSC, US SEC, India CERT-In timelines) and soaring IR costs if identity & driver controls lag behind OS patching.
What We Know (Without the Noise)
- 3 zero-days received fixes; exploitation was observed in the wild before today’s release.
- Expected exploit themes: browser-to-kernel chains, privilege escalation via drivers or service misconfigs, and scriptable bypasses that live off the land.
- Exploitation window stays open for unpatched fleets and internet-facing services that require separate updates (e.g., Exchange, IIS modules, third-party agents).
Why the Real Danger Starts Now
- Patch Diffing & Rapid PoCs: Within days, researchers and criminals diff patches to build more reliable exploits for stragglers.
- Identity Is the New Perimeter: Stolen refresh tokens and malicious OAuth apps persist even after OS patching. Conditional Access gaps equal instant re-compromise.
- Signed Driver Abuse: Vulnerable or revoked drivers can deliver kernel privileges. Without Driver Block Rules you are blind here.
- LOL-Bins & Scripts: PowerShell, WMI, mshta, rundll32 & friends: attackers blend with admin activity to evade AV/EDR.
24–72 Hour Action Plan (Windows & Microsoft 365)
1) Patch, but also stage guardrails
- Prioritize domain controllers, RDS, VDI, VMs in cloud, and any internet-exposed Windows servers.
- Use rings with canary groups; enforce reboot SLAs; verify with health attestation/EDR posture.
2) Identity & OAuth hygiene (Entra ID)
- Enumerate all OAuth app consents; revoke suspicious, limit offline_access.
- Rotate secrets, revoke refresh tokens (sign-in risk policies), require MFA & device compliance.
- Enable Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) and token protection features where available.
3) Driver & kernel hardening
- Enable Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or Smart App Control in enforced mode where feasible.
- Deploy Microsoft-recommended Driver Block Rules across servers & endpoints.
4) Exploit & script abuse controls
- Turn on ASR rules (block Office child process, credential theft, script obfuscation).
- Audit & restrict PowerShell (Constrained Language Mode), log
Module/Script Block
events to SIEM.
5) Monitoring & threat hunting
- Watch for spikes in
SeDebugPrivilege
, event IDs 4688/7045/6416, unexpected driver loads. - Hunt for new service installs, scheduled tasks, LOLBin usage, and abnormal OAuth app creation.
SOC Quick Checks
SIEM hunt ideas: - OAuth: New multi-tenant app consented by non-admins; high-scope consents. - Tokens: Impossible travel + token reuse; long-lived refresh tokens. - Drivers: Kernel-mode loads from non-standard paths; newly blocked drivers. - LOLBins: mshta, rundll32, regsvr32 spawning cmd/wscript/powershell. - DCs: Unusual LSASS memory access; Event 4611, 4688 with lsass.exe handle.
Recommended Controls for High-Risk Windows Fleets
- EDR/XDR with kernel driver telemetry & token theft detections.
- Conditional Access with device compliance, phishing-resistant MFA, and session controls.
- Application control (WDAC) policies and ASR rule bundles for script/Office abuse.
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