- Attackers are buying search ads and spinning up fake Homebrew sites to deliver macOS info-stealers (e.g., AMOS variants). These campaigns have been observed throughout 2025.
- Targets: developers searching “homebrew download / install brew” who click ads or SEO-poisoned links. Similar brand-impersonation waves against macOS dev tools continue.
- Action: verify you installed from the
brew.sh
domain, confirm Git remotes, and run a safe reset. Fleet guidance and SOC hunts below.
What’s happening
Malvertisers clone the Homebrew site, bid on developer keywords, and serve installers that drop information-stealing malware or backdoors. Multiple outlets and researchers documented ad-based and SEO-driven campaigns earlier this year; they continue to evolve and may chain to GitHub brand spoofs.
3-Minute Self-Check (safe commands)
Run in Terminal
on a Mac you suspect. These are defensive/diagnostic and safe to share with end-users.
- Confirm the official install source:
You should have used the command fromhttps://brew.sh
(never an ad or alternate domain). If unsure, proceed with step 2 to reset. - Check your Homebrew Git remotes:
Expected remotes point to the Homebrew organization on GitHub (e.g.,brew config | sed -n '1,80p' brew --repo git -C "$(brew --repo homebrew/core)" remote -v git -C "$(brew --repo homebrew/cask)" remote -v git -C "$(brew --repo)" remote -v
https://github.com/Homebrew/homebrew-core
,homebrew-cask
). Anything else: treat as suspicious. - Safe re-sync (official state):
update-reset re-clones official taps and resets modified state.brew update-reset brew doctor brew cleanup
- Scan Login Items & LaunchAgents (persistence):
Look for unfamiliarls -1 ~/Library/LaunchAgents ls -1 /Library/LaunchAgents ls -1 /Library/LaunchDaemons
.plist
names recently modified. Common stealers hide here after fake installers. - Browsers & keychains: If compromise suspected, rotate credentials and invalidate tokens (GitHub, npm, cloud). Several campaigns aim to steal cookies and wallets.
Enterprise/Fleet Hardening (US/UK/EU dev orgs)
- Block ad-click installs: Instruct teams to use
brew.sh
only; add allow-listing in secure browsers and DNS filters. - Pin the bootstrap: Distribute a signed internal script that fetches the official installer from
brew.sh
and verifies checksum before execution. - MDM guardrails: Use macOS MDM to enforce Gatekeeper/Notarization, approved developer IDs, and block unsigned PKGs and shell installers from non-allow-listed domains.
- Telemetry: EDR rules for sudden
/usr/bin/curl
→bash
patterns launched from browsers and shells during developer onboarding windows. - Repo provenance checks: Require signed commits and enforce SSO + hardware keys on GitHub; tie to incident response if cookies/tokens are at risk. :contentReference[oaicite:8]{index=8}
SIEM/EDR Hunt Ideas (platform-agnostic)
- Malvertising path: Browser history/referrer containing ad-click parameters near a shell
curl | bash
orsh
execution. - Unusual Homebrew taps: New/unknown taps or remotes not under
Homebrew/*
on GitHub. - Persistence drop: New
LaunchAgents
/LoginItems
within 15 minutes of a brew install/update. - Exfil indicators: New connections to recently registered domains immediately after developer tool installation. (Cross-check with brand-impersonation IOCs.)
If You Installed from a Fake Page: What to Do
- Isolate the Mac from corporate networks; preserve logs.
- Reset brew as above; remove unknown taps; re-install toolchains from trusted sources.
- Credential hygiene: Rotate GitHub/Apple ID/Cloud creds; revoke PATs and OAuth tokens; invalidate browser sessions.
- IR sweep: Check LaunchAgents/Daemons, login items, browser extensions; run EDR scan for AMOS/stealer families.
Why this keeps working
Malvertising (fake ads) + SEO spoofing keep landing at the top of results for “install brew.” Developers are time-pressed and used to one-liner installers, so adversaries chain convincing pages with plausible scripts. Ongoing reports throughout 2025 show brand impersonation against macOS software beyond Homebrew as well.
We deliver developer-fleet hardening, brew provenance checks, EDR tuning, and incident response playbooks for macOS shops.
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Defensive services we offer:
- macOS developer fleet hardening & brew provenance checks
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References
- SecurityWeek — Fake Homebrew website malvertising infects macOS users with info-stealers.
- SC Media — Google ads used for fake Homebrew site targeting macOS/Linux.
- Bitdefender — Criminals use fake Mac Homebrew Google ads in new campaign.
- The Hacker News / LastPass — macOS brand impersonation via fake repos and SEO.
- SecurityWeek — Widespread macOS info-stealer impersonation of brands (2025-09).
- CrowdStrike — COOKIE SPIDER / AMOS macOS stealer activity.
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