Who’s Affected

• Teams self-hosting Flowise (Kubernetes, Docker, bare-metal) for AI agents, RAG, chatbots, autonomous tools.
• Environments where ALLOW_BUILTIN_DEP is enabled (often set to use headless browsers for scraping/automation).
• US/EU/UK/AU/IN enterprises in Financial Services, Healthcare (HIPAA), Retail (PCI DSS), Manufacturing/OT, SaaS—especially those subject to SOX, GDPR, SOC 2, ISO 27001, and Cyber insurance requirements.

Business Impact

• Revenue & SLA risk: RCE can disrupt AI-powered customer flows, personalization, or support bots—impacting conversion and uptime.
• Data loss: Exfiltration of embeddings, prompts, API keys, and customer PII → GDPR/CCPA exposure & fines.
• Supply-chain blast radius: Compromised agents can push poisoned data into search indices, vector DBs, CI/CD.
• Insurance & compliance: Unpatched critical CVEs can void cyber insurance claims and SOC 2 attestation.

Root Cause (Technical)

Flowise integrates Puppeteer/Playwright inside a Node VM to power browser automation. In vulnerable builds, authenticated users can craft tools/chains that override the browser binary path and arguments, letting them execute attacker-controlled binaries/flags and escape the sandbox to the host OS. 

Security researchers and advisories also highlight adjacent risks: arbitrary file write (WriteFileTool), weak upload validation, and SSRF in helper APIs—common post-exploitation pivots. Patch them alongside CVE-2025-34267. 

Detection & IOCs

• Unusual node/bash/sh child processes spawned from Flowise container/pod.
• Puppeteer/Playwright invoked with unexpected --executablePath, non-standard flags, or binary paths outside blessed locations. 
• Writes to system dirs from Flowise UID (e.g., /usr/bin, /etc/cron.d), or sudden modifier spikes in /app/.flowise.
• Outbound callbacks (DNS/HTTP) to unfamiliar hosts shortly after tool execution.

Tip: Add rules in EDR/XDR/SIEM (US/EU/UK/AU/IN tenants) to alert on playwright/puppeteer launching external binaries and on file writes beyond app directories.

How to Validate Your Fix 

1. Confirm app version ≥ 3.0.8 in container image and runtime. 
2. Ensure ALLOW_BUILTIN_DEP is false (unless you’ve explicitly risk-accepted and fenced it with AppArmor/SELinux).
3. Run regression tests for agent chains using headless browsers; verify they still function with restricted flags and approved binaries only.

Defense-in-Depth Hardening 

• Zero Trust network policy around Flowise (K8s NetworkPolicy, cloud firewalls). Segment from data lakes, PCI/PHI systems.
• WAF/CDN in front of public Flowise endpoints; enforce OAuth2, SSO, and device posture for admin UI.
• Least-privilege pods with read-only FS, no root, seccomp, and drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Mount tmp dirs noexec.
• Content Security: sign agent artifacts, pin package versions, and mirror npm via Artifact Registry.
• Monitoring: map detections to MITRE ATT&CK (T1059, T1210, T1190, T1021) in your SIEM/XDR.

SOC Runbook: 30-60-90 Minutes

0–30 Minutes

• Block public access; enforce IP allow-lists.
• Snapshot containers/volumes for forensics; preserve logs.

30–60 Minutes

• Patch to 3.0.8+, toggle ALLOW_BUILTIN_DEP=false, redeploy.
• Rotate tokens (LLM/DB/object storage).

60–90 Minutes

• Hunt for persistence (cron, systemd, webshells), clean and re-image if needed.
• File initial incident note for GDPR/PCI/HIPAA if applicable.

FAQ

Is this unauthenticated? No—authenticated exploitation via tools that leverage Puppeteer/Playwright. Don’t treat that as comfort: API keys are easy to phish or steal post-SSRF. 

What version fixes it? 3.0.8+, plus disabling risky flags/deps. Also address related advisories (file write, upload, SSRF). 

We’re on managed Flowise cloud—impacted? Check the provider’s status/advisories and enforce SSO + MFA; assume the same API surfaces unless stated otherwise.