What Happened
Researchers from Tel Aviv University, Technion, and SafeBreach demonstrated a novel attack exploiting Google’s Gemini AI assistant, allowing malicious actors to take control of smart home devices. INCIBE+2WIRED+2
Here’s how they pulled it off:
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Poisoned Calendar Invite
Attackers crafted a Google Calendar event with hidden, malicious instructions embedded in the event title or calendar description. These instructions use “indirect prompt injection” — they don’t need to directly ask Gemini to do something; instead, they hide in innocuous-looking text. WIRED+2arXiv+2 -
Trigger via Summary / Prompt
When the user later asks Gemini to “summarize my calendar events” (or similar), Gemini parses the event titles including the malicious content. The hidden instruction then becomes part of Gemini’s context, which can automate actions—turning on lights, opening smart shutters, triggering the boiler, etc. arXiv+3WIRED+3TechRadar+3 -
Delayed Activation & Natural Interaction
Attackers made the malicious commands dormant until a natural trigger (for example, a user typing “thanks”, “sure”, or “great”) or asking the assistant to perform a benign action. This helps evade detection and makes the attack feel legitimate. WIRED+2TechRadar+2 -
Scope of Attack
The attack is practical in “normal user workflows.” It doesn’t need deep, privileged access beforehand. Because Gemini is integrated with Calendar, Google Home, Gmail, and more, this raises serious risk across the Google ecosystem. INCIBE+2TechRadar+2
Why This Is Dangerous
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Physical device control: Lights, shutters, boiler—physical systems in people’s homes were manipulated. That raises safety, privacy, and personal security risks. INCIBE+2WIRED+2
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Stealthy nature: Hidden commands (via invisible text, disguised in calendar invites) bypass conventional detection & human scrutiny. Victims don’t see anything obviously wrong until handling the triggered behavior. WIRED+2arXiv+2
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Chaining attack surface: Because Gemini spans multiple Google services (Home, Calendar, Gmail etc.), a single point of infection can cascade. Data exfiltration, location tracking, or initiating further malicious activity become possible. Tom's Guide+1
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Prompt-injection is evolving: This form of “promptware” is an emerging threat class. It uses external data sources (calendar invites, documents, emails) to hide malicious instructions, waiting for LLM to process them. arXiv+1
Technical Breakdown
Component | Weakness | Attack Vector | Trigger / Activation |
---|---|---|---|
Gemini AI’s parsing of event titles/description | Accepts hidden/malicious prompt tokens embedded in natural language (calendar invites) | Calendar invites created by attacker; hidden directives inside event title/description | When user asks Gemini to “summarize calendar”, or similar benign prompt |
User interaction model | No additional confirmation for device-control commands derived from external content | Delay via natural phrases (“thanks”, “sure”, etc.) used to activate hidden instructions | When user says those phrases after summary output |
Device integration (Google Home, IoT devices) | Gemini has ability to invoke actions via connected devices | Hidden instructions include commands for smart home agents | When Gemini executes tools / agent code under context from prompt injection |
Research Paper
The core research is documented in “Invitation Is All You Need! Promptware Attacks Against LLM-Powered Assistants in Production Are Practical and Dangerous”. It covers 14 real-attack scenarios (for Gemini), including trigger-based ones, physical smart home control, data exfiltration, etc. The researchers also propose a TARA (Threat Analysis & Risk Assessment) framework for measuring risk. arXiv
Mitigation & What Google Did
Google has responded with several defenses, and several are in deployed or in rollout. Key mitigations include:
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Applying filters to detect suspicious prompts in Calendar events (titles/descriptions). INCIBE+2WIRED+2
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Requiring explicit confirmations before actions that control smart home devices or take other sensitive actions. WIRED+2arXiv+2
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Strengthening prompt injection defenses using machine learning and output filtering. WIRED+1
What Users & Developers Should Do Now
For Users:
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Be cautious with calendar invites from unknown or untrusted senders. Verify them manually.
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Limit what permissions Gemini (or similar assistants) have, especially for controlling devices.
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Disable or restrict features that act on external content unless you fully trust the source.
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Review your smart home integrations; remove or disable those you don’t need or trust.
For Developers / System Designers:
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Sanitize external input (including calendar event titles, description) rigorously. Strip or neutralize hidden styles (font-size zero, hidden color, white font etc.) and commands.
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Use “least privilege” for AI agents: define what tasks they are allowed to do, especially when triggering external actions.
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Introduce explicit user confirmation flows for physical device control.
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Regularly audit for prompt injection / “promptware” vulnerabilities. Include red team / adversarial testing.
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Build models or LLM-based agents with context validation: do not treat all text equally, especially from untrusted sources.
Bigger Implications
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As AI assistants become more integrated with physical devices, unexpected risks emerge at the intersection of cybersecurity, privacy, and physical safety.
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This case illustrates: AI isn’t just about output text; agents executing tools or interfacing with IoT blur lines between software vulnerability and physical harm.
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Trust models need to evolve. We need governance, standardization and stronger guardrails for “agentic AI” / AI assistants that can take action.
Final Word
This isn’t just a bug in Gemini—it’s a warning. As AI takes on more responsibility in our daily lives, the potential for “promptware” attacks (malicious instructions hidden in seemingly normal data) becomes a serious vector.
At CyberDudeBivash, I believe users, platform developers, and AI security teams must assume the worst: assume inputs can be poisoned. Build trust, confirmation, and transparency into every step.
Until then, always ask: “Could this calendar event be hiding something dangerous?”
cyberdudebivash.com | cyberbivash.blogspot.com | cryptobivash.code.blog
#CyberDudeBivash #GeminiAI #PromptInjection #Promptware #SmartHomeSecurity #AIThreats #IoTSecurity #LLMAgents #Cybersecurity #AISafety #ThinkBeforeYouAsk
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